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Success of the Constellation Program's lunar architecture requires successfuUy 
launching two vehicles, Ares IJOrion and Ares V/Altair, within a very limited time. period. 
The reliability and maintainability of flight vehicles and ground systems must deliver a high 
probability of successfully launching the second· vehicle in order to avoid wasting the on-
orbit asset launched by the first vehicle. The Ground Operations Project determined which 
ground subsystems had the potential to affect the probability of the second launch and 
allocated quantitative availability requirements to these subsystems. The Ground 
Operations Project also developed a methodology to estimate subsystem reliability, 
availability, and maintainability to ensure that ground subsystems complied with allocated 
launch availability and maintainability requirements. The verification analysis developed 
quantitative estimates of subsystem availability based on design documentation, testing 
results, and other information. Where appropriate, actual performance history was used to 
calculate failure rates for legacy subsystems or comparative components that will support 
Constellation. The results of the verification analysis will be used to assess compliance with 
requirements and to highlight design or performance shortcomings for further decision-
making. This case study will discuss the subsystem requirements allocation process, describe 
the ground systems methodology for completing quantitative reliability, availability, and 
maintainability analysis, and present findings and observation based on analysis leading to 
the Ground Operations Project Preliminary Design Review milestone. 
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I. Introduction 
T HE Constellation Architecture for human lunar exploration missions requires two launches: the Ares V carrying the Earth Departure Stage (EDS) and Lunar Lander and the Ares I lofting the Orion Crew Capsule. 
The two vehicles are nominally launched 90 minutes apart from Launch Complex-39 pads A and B at Kennedy 
Space Center (KSC). The architecture permits launching the vehicles in either order, and both the EDSlLunar 
Lander payload compliment and Orion have the capability to loiter for a few days in Low Earth Orbit prior to 
rendezvous and Trans-Lunar InjeCtion. Viability of the two-launch architecture is highly dependent on the reliability 
and maintainability of ground systems and the flight vehicles, particularly after the first vehicle has launched. Due to 
limitations in how long the first vehicle can loiter in orbit and successfully achieve the mission, the second vehicle 
must deliver a very high probability of successfully launching in sufficient time to avoid wasting the frrst-Iaunched 
on-orbit spacecraft. Accordingly, the Constellation Program developed a probability of launch requirement that 
bounded the acceptable risk of mission failure due to a second vehicle launch failure at less than one percent. This 
requirement stated, ''The Constellation Architecture shall have a probability of crewed lunar mission launch of not 
less than 99 percent during the period beginning with the launch of the frrst vehicle and ending at the expiration of 
the last launch opportunity to achieve the targeted Trans-Lunar Injection window.'" This overarching requirement 
was decomposed into two child requirements that flowed to each of the Constellation Projects; including the launch 
vehicle, the spacecraft, and ground systems. 
I) The first child requirement stated that the launch vehicle, spacecraft, or ground systems shall have a 
probability of launch of not less than (a value for ranging between 99 percent and 94 percent, depending 
on the project) beginning with the decision to load cryogenic propellants and ending with the close of 
the day-of-Iaunch window for the initial planned attempt. This critical time period was originally 
estimated at about fourteen hours, and then later revised to ten hours." 
2) The second child requirement stated that in the event of a failure, the launch vehicle, spacecraft, or 
ground systems must deliver a probability of repair of some percentage of not less than (a value for 
ranging between 30 and 45 percent, depending on the project) in order to be prepared to support at least 
one additional launch attempt within an acceptable time period (approximately three days). 
At frrst consideration, the child requirements would seem inconsistent with the parent requirement for the 
architecture to deliver not less than a 99 percent chance of success. For example, if the launch vehicle and the 
spacecraft each delivered a 98 percent probability of success and ground systems delivered a 99 percent probability 
of success, the architecture would deliver only a 95 percent probability of success. This is true only for the frrst 
launch attempt. The second child requirement, which defines the maintainability standards, enables a likelihood of a 
second launch attempt in the event of a launch failure. The combined likelihood of a successful repair and at least 
one additional launch attempt enables the architecture to satisfy the overarching requirement to deliver a probability 
of successful launch within the acceptable time period of not less than 99 percent. The Constellation architecture and 
the launch probability requirements flow is illustrated in Figure I. 
This paper describes how the Constellation Ground Operations Project (GOP) applied quantitative Reliability, 
Maintainability, and Availability (RMA) theory, tools, and techniques to allocate launch probability requirements 
and to assess compliance with those launch probability requirements for the Constellation Ground System. 
Additionally, the paper describes how the launch probability assessment was leveraged and translated into assessing 
maintainability of the Ground System, evaluating compliance with the second child (maintainability) requirement, 
and focusing efforts on logistics support and operations planning. 
It should be noted that, due to the sensitivity of the detailed analysis products, specific subsystem analysis 
results, subsystem names, and specific descriptive information have been generalized. However, specific analysis 
results are provided to demonstrate the analysis process and the benefits of the effort. Information contained within 
this report was developed prior to the GOP Preliminary Design Review (PDR) milestone . 
•• Although there were two iterations of critical time period duration and changes to subsystems included in the 
analysis, for consistency, the final critical time period value of \0 hours and the final configuration of ground 
subsystems are used throughout this paper. 
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Figure 1. ConsteUation 2-Launch Lunar Architecture and the Associated Launch Probability Requirements 
Flow to Ground Subsystems 
II. Phase I - Ground Systems Requirements and the Initial Allocation Process 
Constellation GOP was allocated a requirement to deliver not less than a 99 percent probability of launch. In 
other words, Constellation requirements dictated that no more than one in 100 launch attempts could be scrubbed 
due to a failure of the Ground Systems after the point loading of cryogenic propellants is initiated. Historically, 
throughout the Space Shuttle Program, tanking for launch was initiated approximately 205 times and there have 
been approximately 24 instances where the planned launch time was delayed due to ground systems faults.2 
Accordingly, Ground Systems delivered an approximately 88 percent probability of successful launch support 
throughout the Space Shuttle Program. The Constellation architecture requires significant improvements in the 
reliability of its ground systems versus the Space Shuttle ground systems. 
In response to the requirement to deliver not less than a 99 percent probability of launch, the Constellation GOP 
developed an approach to decompose and allocate launch availability requirements to the subsystem level of the 
Ground System. This method was not standard requirements flow practice since it bypassed the intermediate 
"Element" level in the requirement flow down. The benefit of this direct approach was in aligning the launch 
availability analysis with the subsystem design review process and the subsystem design team structure. 
The initial requirements allocation analysis consisted of determining which ground subsystems would be 
included in the analysis. The determination was based on the sole criteria that a failure in the subsystem could result 
in a launch hold or scrub during the critical time period between cryogenic propellant loading and launch. Since a 
failure within each selected subsystem could cause a launch hold or scrub, all subsystems within the probability of 
launch analysis were considered in series. The reliability of a number (n) of components in series at a given time is 
the product of the reliability of those components, as shown in Eq. (I). 
Rs =R\ *~ ... *Rn (I) 
In order to assess where the general quantitative requirement values should be, the RMA team applied Eq. (I) to 
determine the required reliability for n=55 identical subsystems in series to deliver a 99 percent probability of 
launch. Equation (2) shows the calculation and the results. 
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Rt_M =VR: =~O.99 =.999817 (2) 
As a result of this simple analysis, several factors became apparent, including the following: 
I) Given the limited knowledge of actual subsystem performance or design at the time, launch availability 
requirements were allocated as "order of magnitude" requirements (such as 0.999, 0.9999, 0.99999, 
etc), at least initially. 
2) If approximately 55 ground subsystems were all required to operate successfully through the critical time 
period, the vast majority of these subsystems would need to deliver at least 0.9999 availability through 
the critical time period. 
3) Since the overall result was multiplicative, no subsystem could deliver less than 0.99 availability and 
successfully meet the overall ground systems 99 percent probability of launch requirement. Only a very 
small number of systems delivering 0.999 availability could be tolerated. 
Based on the observations above, subsystems that met the launch hold or scrub criteria were subjected to further 
analysis to determine the following: 
I) If the subsystem was repairable within the operational constraints of the launch time frame. For example, 
once propellant loading begins, access to the launch pad area becomes extremely limited. If a repair is 
required within the clear area, the launch is generally scrubbed, propellants are drained from the vehicle, 
and access is restored after confIrming a safe work environment. Subsystems within this launch clear 
area would be analyzed for subsystem reliability during the critical period since repairs could not 
contribute to subsystem availability. Subsystems with components located outside the launch clear area 
received credit for repair capabilities during the countdown in the event of a failure, if the repair could 
reasonably support the countdown time limitations. 
2) If the subsystem was inherently high or low availability. High availability subsystems would be required 
to deliver not less than a 99.99 percent probability of successful operation through the critical time 
period. Low availability subsystems would be required to deliver not less than a 99.90 percent 
probability of successful operation through the critical time period. Factors indicating that a subsystem 
should be designated as high availability included subsystem criticality, redundancy, reparability, and/or 
demonstrated highly reliability performance. Factors indicating a low availability designation included 
non-reparability, low historical performance, low redundancy, and/or design risk. Subsequently, a third 
category (very high) was added for subsystems that, due to their construction, were so monumental that a 
failure was extremely unlikely. Facility structures such as flame chutes, launch mounts, and lightning 
towers typically populated this new category. These subsystems were assifned a requirement of 99.999 
percent probability of successful operation through the critical time period. 
The RMA team developed an initial matrix that summarized all of the ground subsystems, the KSC organization 
responsible for the design, whether the system was included in or excluded from the analysis and why, whether or 
not the system was repairable, and an initial high, low, or very high availability allocation for "included" 
subsystems. This matrix was continuously refined with input and support from various subject matter experts from 
the Space Shuttle Launch Operations Team, Ground Systems design teams, and Safety and Mission Assurance 
staffs. Support from each of these organizations was superb with each stakeholder organization contributing 
significantly to the quality and clarity of the final allocation. In this process, adjustments were made, assumptions 
were challenged, and the refined requirements were formally allocated into subsystem design requirements. 
Of the 80 subsystems that made up Constellation Ground Systems4: 
• 25 subsystems were excluded as they were evaluated as having no impact on launch availability within the 
critical time period 
• 2 subsystems were evaluated as low availability 
• 48 subsystems were evaluated as high availability 
• 5 subsystems were evaluated as very high availability due to the extremely low probability of structural 
failure within the critical time frame 
Overall, 55 subsystems were identified for subsequent launch availability analysis. A simple reliability 
calculation was used to assess Ground Systems' overall launch availability if each of the 55 subsystems met their 
allocated launch availability requirement through the 10 hour critical time period. It is important to restate that the 
sole criterion for selecting a subsystem for inclusion in the launch availability requirement and analysis process was 
that a failure in the subsystem could result in a launch hold or scrub. This would indicate consistency with 
independent failure theory and calculation techniques, since a single subsystem failure would cause a complete 
ground systems failure. The calculation and the results shown in Eq. (3) provided an initial assessment that the 
allocated subsystem requirements exceeded the overarching Ground Systems requirement of 99 percent. Therefore, 
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if each subsystem meets or exceeds its allocated availability requirement, overall Ground Systems will meet or 
exceed the second launch availability requirement. 
R(lOhrs) = (0.999)2 *(0.9999)48 *(0.99999)5 
R(lOhrs) = .993172 
The allocation method and results described above were highly favorable for the following reasons: 
(3) 
I) The order of magnitude differences between the low, high, and very high allocations were appropriate, 
since predicting the availability of complex subsystems is not a precise process. 
2) Refining the allocations beyond the order of magnitude measures added little value for the design 
engineer, at least initially. 
3) The excess 0.003172 provided management reserve or growth margin to address unexpected 
developments that may occur during the ground system development process. Within the management 
reserve an additional three "low availability" subsystems and one "high availability" subsystems could 
be added (or two "low availability" and II "high availability" subsystems could be added, etc.) and still 
meet the overall Ground Systems 99 percent launch availability requirements. This also provided the 
ability to accommodate some limited cases where subsystems failed to ·meet the allocated launch 
probability requirements. 
Phase-I was completed when allocated launch availability requirements were approved by GOP decision makers. 
The initial requirements were revised over time to add and remove subsystems, as required, as the Project and the 
associated designs matured. 
III. Phase II - Subsystem Analysis 
When approved probability of launch requirements were formally allocated to the subsystem level, the analysis 
effort began to assess each of the subsystems' compliance with the requirements. Requirements verification 
language specified the use of quantitative analysis techniques to assess and validate compliance with the overarching 
probability of launch requirements. In constructing the analysis methodology, the GOP RMA team envisioned the 
following key outputs of the analysis and the associated products: 
I) A quantitative estimate of subsystem reliability (or availability for systems that could be repaired within 
the critical time period) for the critical time period using a 95 percent confidence interval. 
2) Clear documentation of the analysis assumptions. For example, if the subsystem analysis assumed that a 
launch countdown would continue if one of two redundant paths failed, the assumption would need 
further validation within the Launch Commit Criteria process. 
3) Recommendations for potential improvements in subsystem predicted performance early in the design in 
the process, when adjustments are easier to make and are less costly. 
4) An initial look into potential logistics support priorities, understanding that a more detailed 
maintainability analysis would follow in the Phase m analysis. 
These key outputs were envisioned to support informed decision making as new design subsystems were 
developed. Additionally, several legacy subsystems were allocated launch probability requirements, as they would 
also be required to support Constellation launch operations. Therefore, Phase II launch probability analysis would 
inform decisions regarding design alterations to both new and legacy subsystems. In addition to design changes, 
other methods to improve launch probability would be considered, such as adjustments to operational limits, 
procedural concepts, or adjustments to the launch availability requirement for the subsystem within the available 
trade space. 
The GOP RMA team evaluated a number of tools and techniques to meet the analysis requirements. Discrete 
Event Simulation (DES), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), and classic reliability and maintainability techniques 
were among the techniques considered. In order to produce quantitative outputs described above based on 
subsystems design, component failure data, and the subsystem configuration, the clear choice in developing the 
RMA team's approach was to apply classic reliability and maintainability techniques. 
Recognizing that KSC's ground systems were highly complex and many had built in redundancy or stand-by 
features, the more simplistic classical RMA parts counts methodologies would not produce accurate reliability 
estimates. Parts count methodologies essentially assume that all parts exist in series and that any failure will cause 
system failure. Therefore, the Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) analysis method was selected since it appropriately 
addressed subsystem functionality, operability, maintainability, and redundancy. 
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A. Analysis Tool Background 
KSC's Integrated Design and Assurance System (IDAS) project provided an excellent source of information, 
support, and tool suites to address a wide variety of reliability and assurance activities. The IDAS web site explains 
that, "IDAS shares and supports tools that perform technical analysis for the design, system, safety, mission 
assurance and sustaining engineering functions over the life cycle of a system. In addition, IDAS collects and shares 
information that helps the engineer or analyst to learn and apply the tools and techniques."s IDAS also provided 
access to a variety of reliability software suites. One of those suites, an RMA-focused software package, delivered a 
broad spectrum of design, development, and life-cycle RMA analysis tools. This software was readily available to 
KSC users through the Center network, along with user support, training, and technical resources through the 
Center's support contract with the vendor. 
The Constellation GOP RMA team primarily uses this software suite in support of the probability of launch 
availability and maintainability analyses. In this effort, the most commonly used reliability software modules are the 
Reliability Prediction and RBD modules. The GOP RMA team also uses the Weibull capabilities to develop failure 
rates using historical data from various failure reporting and corrective action systems. In order to understand the 
analysis process and the underlying methodology, a brief primer will be useful to set the stage for the subsequent 
discussion. 
RBD techniques form the foundation of the GOP launch availability and maintainability analysis. An RBD is a 
symbolic logic model that depicts system functionality and operates in the success domain. Each RBD has a specific 
start and a specific end. Each block within the RBD may represent an individual component, such as a resistor or 
screw, or blocks may represent components and/or assemblies at a higher level, such as an entire automobile engine 
or a complete pump, if sufficient reliability (and repair) data are available. Each RBD block captures the failure and 
repair parameters of each element within the system. 
RBD blocks are connected functionally to replicate the system's operational characteristics. Blocks are 
connected in series if each element is required for the system to operate. Parallel branches are used when only a 
subset of the depicted branches is required. This would be used when only one of two (or two of three, etc.) parallel 
branches are required to operate the system successfully. 
. The examples below depict several representations of simple RBD configurations and their associated reliability 
calculation formulae are provided in Eqs. (4) and (5). 
Series 
(4) 
Parallel 
(5) 
The concepts and mathematical relationships from the basic building blocks above are applied to calculating the 
reliability of more complex systems. In application, variations and combinations of these of these basic patterns are 
used to depict the components of a system, the interconnections, and how they interact as the system operates as 
shown in Eqs. (6) and (7) below. 
Series-Parallel 
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Rs = (1-(1- R1)*(I- R2»*(I-(I- R3 ) * (1- R4 » (6) 
Parallel-Series 
R = 1-(1- R * R ) * (1- R * R ) S I 2 3 4 (7) 
The second key reliability software module used in the GOP launch availability effort is the Reliability 
Prediction module. This portion of the software shares data with many other packaged modules, including the RBD 
module. The Reliability Prediction module was used to capture and store failure and repair data for parts, . 
components, and assemblies used in an associated RBD. 
The software tool Reliability Prediction module can be used to develop parts listings from user input data or 
from parts libraries such as MIL-HDBK-2l7 for electronic parts, Reliability Analysis Center's handbook NPRD-95 
for non-electronic parts, and NSWC-98 "Handbook of Reliability Prediction Procedures for Mechanical 
Equipment." These capabilities allow the user to develop a complete parts library for the specific system based on a 
variety of different sources and techniques. The Reliability Prediction module also supports multiple failure and 
repair distributions. 
Since the Reliability Prediction module shares data with the RBD module (and others), components in the parts 
library can be pulled into the RBD as it is developed. This feature improves the ease of RBD construction and the 
accuracy of the RBD data. A single part in the library may be used multiple times in the system being modeled, but 
if the failure rate needs to be updated based on new data, this only needs to be done in the Reliability Prediction 
module, with the RBD being updated automatically upon calculation of the reliability of the system. 
B. Analysis Methodology 
The GOP RMA team initially encountered a significant amount of skepticism early in the project. Throughout 
the initial allocation process, a number of concerns were voiced by the various stakeholders. The most frequent 
concerns were: 
I) "Meeting these requirements will drive cost through the roof." 
2) ''The design teams are already overtaxed. This RMA work will create huge burdens on the design teams 
and detract from the real work within the design effort." 
3) ''There's no way we will ever meet this requirement for 99.99 percent reliability at the subsystem 
level." 
4) "We think you did the math wrong on the allocation process." 
Through several weeks of discussion, stakeholders developed a better understanding of the analysis objectives 
and the RMA team developed a better appreciation for their concerns. Accordingly, a methodology was developed 
that was focused on achieving the following objectives: 
I) Introduce the RMA team as an embedded member of each design team and as a resource to the design 
team. 
2) Minimize the time impact on the design team by developing an independent understanding of the design 
package within the RMA team and using the design team only for clarification or confrrmation that the 
model and underlying assumptions were correct. 
3) Link the RMA analysis to the design review milestones, wherever possible, and include the Launch 
Availability Analysis report as a reviewable document within the design package. 
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4) Provide feedback to the design team, such as reliability improvement recommendations, throughout the 
design process and deliver no surprises to the design team in the final analysis. This includes supporting 
the design effort by evaluating alternative solutions from a system reliability perspective. 
In execution, these objectives were largely achieved by following a similar process through each subsystem 
analysis. First, an analysis schedule was developed based on the subsystem design review schedule. Launch 
availability analyses supported the 60 percent, 90 percent, and 100 percent design reviews for each subsystem with 
an allocated probability of launch requirement. tt Each analysis was documented in a peer-reviewed report. The 
analysis followed the following general process: 
I) The design package was made available to the RMA team electronically. 
2) The RMA team reviewed the design package to become oriented with the subsystem functionality, 
operations concepts, and specific design. The following documents and data sources within the design 
review package were assessed within the launch availability analysis: 
a. Operational Concept Documents 
b. System Assurance Analysis (SAA) - which included fault tree and hazard analyses 
c. Drawings and Schematics 
d. Parts information and listings 
e. Logistics Support Analysis (LSA) 
f. Interface diagrams and tables 
g. Launch Commit Criteria documentation 
h. Subsystem training plans 
i. Lessons learned reports 
j. ProcUrement specifications 
k. Subsystem Requirements Documents 
3) Based on the integrated understanding of subsystem functionality, operating profile, and risks developed 
during the design package review, the RMA team decomposed the subsystem to an appropriate level, 
developed functional flow diagrams, and produced initial parts listings specific to the design. The flow 
diagrams reflected the operational usage, system layout, connectivity, and redundancy schemes, and 
formed the basis for subsequent RBD development. Frequently, several functional flow diagrams would 
be required to capture the necessary scope of the subsystem. 
4) Having developed an initial understanding of the subsystem operation and functionality, the RMA team 
conducted an initial meeting with the design team to confirm that there was a correct understanding of 
subsystem operations, confirm or revise functional flow diagrams, resolve questions, review the parts 
listing, if required, and to determine if any subsequent design changes were in work for the design 
release. These initial meetings normally lasted one to two hours. The knowledge of the design team was 
instrumental in accurately capturing how the subsystem operates, which components need to be 
included in the reliability analysis, the associated failure data, and how to best map the subsystem 
configuration in the RBD. . 
5) Building on the knowledge developed and a common understanding (with the design team) of the 
subsystem operation, layout, components and assumptions, the RMA team refined the parts list and the 
associated failure and repair data for each modeled component or assembly. This information was 
catalogued in the associated software Reliability Prediction module for the subsystem. Failure and 
repair data was compiled using the following information sources to determine the most accurate and 
most applicable data: 
a. Manufacturer's data for the specific part 
b. Failure data develop from like-comparison failure histories 
c. Parts libraries 
d. Other reference materials such as IEEE Std 493-2007, IEEE Recommended Practice for the 
Design of Reliable Industrial and Commercial Power Systems 
e. Test data 
f. Reliability prediction techniques 
6) RBDs modeling the subsystem were then developed using the information from the functional flow 
block diagrams and the reliability and repair data contained for each component or assembly in the 
tt Not all subsystems followed the 30, 60, 90, and 100 percent design review process. A few subsystems deviated 
with other design review milestones such as 45 and 90 percent. The Legacy subsystems usually did not have any 
associated design review milestones. 
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associated parts library in the Prediction module. All components analyzed within the RBD were 
considered to be operating at optimum level and conditions until a failure occurred. The configuration 
of all components within the RBD determined if the system's success was dependent on one or more 
component failures. The blocks of the RBD may represent individual components or component 
substructures, which in turn may be represented by other RBDs. The complexity of the RBDs is 
dependent upon various factors such as mission profiles, function criticality, and redundancy 
characteristics. 
7) Initial estimates were developed using the RBD module Monte Carlo simulator for the 10 hour critical 
time period and a 95 percent confidence interval. Normally, one million Monte Carlo simulations were 
executed. The results were examined and peer reviewed by the RMA team to verify that all connections 
were correctly made, the correct parts were in the correct locations, the parts data were correctly 
entered, and that the RBD functioned as depicted in the functional flow diagram. 
8) Initial observations were developed and shared with the design team during a second feedback session. 
RMA team observations shared with the design team frequently included: 
a. Reliability improvement recommendations 
b. Drawing corrections 
c. High failure rate nodes within the design 
d. Design inconsistencies 
e. GIDEP alerts on parts specified for use 
f. Obsolete parts specified for use 
9) The analysis report was then developed in support of the design review schedule. A documentation 
scheme was developed that captured the RMA requirements compliance verification process6 and 
verification of probabilistic requirements using a six step process.7 
10) After peer review and further coordination with the design team, the report was loaded into the design 
review package as a reviewable and commentable document. 
c. Launch Availability Analysis Observations 
At the GOP PDR milestone, 29 of the 55 subsystems with allocated probability of launch requirements had been 
analyzed at least once. Most of the analyzed subsystems were new design subsystems and a few were legacy 
subsystems. Analysis priority was given to the new design subsystems and supporting their mUltiple design reviews 
over the legacy subsystems. 
Across the 29 analyzed systems, the following facts emerged leading into the PDR: 
I) 22 of the 29 subsystems met or exceeded their allocated launch availability requirements 
2) 7 of the 29 subsystems fell slightly short of meeting their launch availability requirements 
3) Overall, the 29 evaluated subsystems delivered a 0.9966 probability of launch. The net requirement for 
these 29 subsystems was to deliver not less than 0.9953 launch availability. 
4) If the remaining 26 subsystems met or exceeded their allocated requirements, the GOP would deliver an 
overall launch availability of 99.44 percent, exceeding the overarching requirement. 
Although the launch availability assessment as of PDR indicated that Constellation Ground Systems was on track to 
meet or exceed the 99 percent probability of launch requirement (with 95 percent confidence), additional analysis of 
the reliability growth through the process provided more insight into the impact of the RMA process on the 
subsystem designs. Of the 29 analyzed subsystems, nine were reviewed more than once. The reliability growth 
calculated for each of these nine subsystems as they progressed through multiple reviews is summarized in Table I. 
The results indicate the following about subsystem reliability improvement using the methodology stated in this 
paper: 
I) On average, the RMA and design teams improved the reliability of subsystems by a factor of 9.3. This 
result is the ratio of the average improVed design MTTF over the average original design MTTF. 
2) The reliability improv~ment results in Table I are understated for two reasons: 
a. Many design improvements were often incorporated into the initial design packages as a result 
of the initial launch availability analysis. 
b. The to hour subsystem availability value was "capped" at no better than 0.999999. Several 
subsystems had better estimated performance. 
3) The frrst subsystem in Table I is indicative of improvements achieved in a subsystem without reliability 
improvement included into the initial design package. Due to the timing of this design package, little or 
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no RMA team input to design reliability was incorporated into the initial design package. In this case, 
the reliability improvement factor was estimated at about 250. 
Initial 
Reliability 
Initial MTIF 
MTIF(hrs) Reliabilty 
Subsystem 
Reliability 
Improvemmts (hrs) Improvements Improvement 
Implemented Implemented Factor 
I 0.999750 0.999999 39,995 9,999,995 250.0 
2 0.999930 0.999999 142,852 9,999,995 70.0 
4 0.999940 0.999999 166,662 9,999,995 60.0 
5 0.999885 0.999970 86,952 333,328 3.8 
6 0.999997 0.999999 3,333,328 9,999,995 3.0 
7 0.999915 0.999965 117,642 285,709 2.4 
8 0.998363 0.999207 6,104 12,605 2.1 
9 0.999981 0.999983 526,311 588,230 1.1 
0.W7762 0.999121 552,481 5,152,482 49.1 
Compos ite Reliability Average 
(RI *R2*R3 ... *R9) Average MTIF Improvement 
Factor 
..... ~ ~ _._ •. ___ '_-0 
Table 1. Reliability Improvement of Subsystems with Multiple Reviews 
4) The average of the nine reliability improvement factors indicates an average improvement factor of 49 
across the nine subsystems with multiple reviews. 
In each of the nine cases, subsystem availability improVed as a direct result of the implemented approach and 
methodology. In the analysis of each of the first 29 Ground Operations subsystems, performance improvements 
were made by identifying the follow types of problems: 
1) Adding redundancy to key failure nodes 
2) Clearly identifying and challenging which functional elements of the subsystem were actually required to 
support launch countdown 
3) Clarifying or establishing operational criteria, such as, two of three "strings" within the subsystem must 
be operable to continue the countdown 
4) Replacing obsolete parts or components within the design with current or improved parts 
5) Identifying manufacturer parts with better performance for key failure nodes 
6) Identifying linked nodes of failure that will reduce the effectiveness of existing subsystem redundancy 
7) Identifying inconsistencies across multiple subsystems. 
Additionally, reliability improvements that were identified within one subsystem were sometimes carried across 
multiple subsystems designs. For example, the RMA team discovered that the greatest contribution to the 
unreliability of one subsystem was from the power scheme. This power scheme was used within many other 
subsystems designs. Working with the subsystem designers, the RMA team evaluated and recommended potential 
power scheme improvements based on quantitative reliability results. The most suitable power scheme configuration 
was then propagated through other subsystem designs, improving their performance and overall GOP launch 
availability. 
IV. The Maintainability Requirement 
As the launch availability methodology was refined, the GOP RMA team developed a second methodology to 
assess subsystem maintainability and compliance with the requirement that in the event of a failure, ground systems 
must be able to repair at least 30 percent of the failures and support readiness for launch within a limited time period 
(69 hours). This requirement was flowed directly to each ground subsystem with an allocated launch availability 
requirement less stringent than 0.99999. 
The methodology to assess subsystem maintainability leveraged the subsystem RBD already developed under 
the launch availability analysis. If the RBD could be used to show the relative likelihood/of the various failure paths, 
then repair scenarios could be evaluated for the most likely failures. Fault Tree Analysis uses a similar technique 
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called cut set analysis. The RMA team found the best explanation of cut sets to be "unique combinations of 
component failures that can cause system failure."g The article further defined a minimal cut set as "when any basic 
event (failure of a component) is removed from the set, the remaining events collectively are no longer a cut set.,,9 
Minimal cut sets can be used to understand the likelihood of a subsystem failure. Essentially, minimal cut sets define 
all of the combinations of component failures that result in system failure. Minimal cut sets may consist of one of 
more components. For complex or redundant systems, minimal cut sets can (and do) number in the millions. By 
defining each component within a cut set, the analyst can calculate the likelihood of all events occurring within a 
stated time period. In this application, cut sets are used to evaluate subsystem unavailability. 
As an example, consider a system that can fail in 1,000 different ways. Each failure path may contain any 
number of components, from one to many. Each of those failure paths are defined by the components that contribute 
to the failure path and by the failure data for each of the contributing components. Unavailability can then be 
calculated for each failure path within the given time period. The ,cut set results can be numerically ordered, for 
example, from the highest unavailability to the least for each of the 1,000 failure paths. This shows the analyst the 
quantitative estimate for each failure path and the relative likelihood of the failure occurring within the system. 
The reliability software package used by the RMA team delivers the ability to produce cut set analysis from 
within the RBD module. Therefore, cut sets derived from an RBD can be used to determine each failure path that 
causes the system to fail and the combined unreliability of those components within each cut set. Since this is a 
calculated value based on the failure data for each component (retained in the RBD and the associated parts library), 
the unreliability of each failure path can be calculated as a point estimate, .and the composite cut set listing can be 
rank ordered from most likely to least likely to occur. Additionally, since the unavailability associated with each cut 
set is a calculated value, they can be readily compared within the subsystem, and since each subsystem could 
individually create a hold or scrub if it failed, cut sets can be compared and ranked across ground subsystems. 
A. Cut Sets - Easier Said Than Done 
The complexity of KSC's ground systems required developing very sophisticated RBDs. Some complex 
subsystems were modeled with over 3,000 blocks. In order to organize such systems, the software package RBD 
module provides the capability to create "linked diagrams" within an RBD. This allows a top level outline level 
RBD to be decomposed into one or many linked diagrams where lower levels of detail are developed and displayed. 
This technique does not create problems with the RBD module reliability or availability calculations. It does, 
however, create problems in developing integrated cut set results within complex systems that use linked diagrams. 
The GOP RMA team observed that the software would not calculate cut set results for linked diagrams. 
However, cut sets could readily be developed for lower level diagrams as long as a linked diagram was not included. 
The RMA team presented this issue to the vendor to resolve. As of the date of this report, resolution of the cut set 
compilation problem was ongoing by the vendor. In the meantime, a more labor intensive work-around was 
successfully developed to gather, compile, and rank cut set output using a spreadsheet in order to complete the 
maintainability analysis process. 
B. Cut Set Analysis Results 
Leading up to the PDR milestone, the RMA team had successfully evaluated cut set results for 15 subsystems. 
Several subsystems produced millions of cut sets. One complex and highly redundant subsystem produced over 2 
billion cut sets. Due to the complexity of managing millions of cut sets and the extremely low probability of many of 
the possible failure paths, cut sets with unavailability less than lxlO-16 (point estimate) were not included in the 
analysis. Table 2 shows the cut set results for these 15 subsystems. 
The results show that for many of these systems, most of the failures come from a very limited number of failure 
paths. On average, about one-tenth of one percent of a bounded set of all possible failure paths (only those cut sets 
with greater than IxlO- 16 unavailability) caused about 30 percent of the subsystem unavailability. Less than one 
percent of these paths caused about 90 percent of the failures. 
Although the RMA team expected that most subsystem failures would come from a limited number of sources, 
these results were surprising. The implications of this analysis for reliability improvement and validation of the 
maintainability requirement were also highly significant. When a small number of failure paths make such large 
contributions to subsystem unavailability, isolating the key failure paths becomes obvious. Even in a complex 
system with thousands of components, the cut set analysis clearly shows the most likely paths. This enables the 
design team to focus on either: 
I) Improving the design to correct the high failure nodes (improving reliability), or 
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2) Ensuring that the component is as repairable as possible (improving maintainability) by ensuring that 
access is to the component(s) is readily available, appropriate spares are established, and repair 
procedures are developed and tested. 
Cut set analysis provides clear indication of where the most likely failure paths would be depending on the 
accuracy of the RBD that depicts the subsystem arrangement and the accuracy of the failure data contained within 
the parts library. 
Number of Number of CUt Percentage of Number of CUt Percentage of 
CUt Sets Sets (30% of CUt Sets (30% Sets (90% of CUt Sets (90% 
Subsystem (Unavailability Subsystem of Subsystem Subsystem of Subs ys tern 
Subsystem Reliability > 1E-16) Unavailability) Unavailability) Unavailability) Unavailability) 
a 0.999999 1,751 9 051% 211 12.05% 
b 0.999239 29 I 3.45% 12 41.38% 
c 0.999319 32 I 3.13% 13 40.63% 
d 0.999671 39 2 5.13% 20 51.28% 
e 0.999721 13 I 7.69% 7 53.85% 
f 0.999974 (f)2 I 0.14% 3 0.43% 
g 0.999983 270 I 0.37% 4 1.48% 
h 0.999999 393,480 390 0.10% 1,150 0.29% 
i 0.999938 5,729 9 0.16% 36 0.63% 
j 0.999997 263 I 0.38% II 4.18% 
k 0.999885 28,653 12 0.04% 121 0.42% 
I 0.999825 15 I 6.67% 3 20% 
m 0.999488 2,908 I 0.03% 292 10% 
n 0.999358 968 30 3.10% 40 4% 
0 0.999999 20 I 5.00% 3 15% 
l I 
434,862 461 0.11% 1,926 0.44% 
--l Total Total Average Total Total Average 
. . Table 2. Cut Set AnalysIS Results for Fifteen Subsystems 
V. Conclusion 
The work accomplished by the Constellation Ground Operations RMA team in conjunction with the many 
contributing design teams was instrumental in developing and assessing compliance with quantitative requirements 
for both probability of launch and subsystem maintainability. The analysis methodology produced results that were 
highly repeatable and auditable. The process made significant and measurable contributions to ground systems 
reliability. As of the Constellation Ground Operations Project Preliminary Design Review milestone, the GOP was 
on track to exceed the requirement for Ground Systems to deliver a 99 percent probability of launch for the second 
launched vehicle in the Constellation architecture. If the Space Shuttle Program ground systems design effort was 
able to achieve similar improvements in ground system launch availability as shown in this report, Shuttle ground 
systems performance could have improved from the historical 88 percent to at least 98.6 percent launch availability. 
In planning to recover from a launch scrub, the maintainability analysis using cut set techniques clearly identified 
the most critical failure nodes and where resources could be best applied to evaluate subsystem improvement (to 
prevent the problem) or to improve the subsystem maintainability (to successfully recover). This analysis is highly 
adaptable and usable across a wide variety of RMA applications. 
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DES 
IDAS 
GIDEP 
GOP 
GS-SRD 
MTBF 
MTTF 
PDR 
PRA 
RBD 
RMA 
ReliabiUty 
Discrete Event Simulation 
Appendix A 
Acronym List 
Integrated Design and Assurance System 
Government-Industry Data Exchange Program 
Ground Operations Project 
Ground Systems - Systems Requirements Document 
Mean Time Between Failure 
Mean Time to Failure 
Preliminary Design Review 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
Reliability Block Diagram 
Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability 
AppendixB 
Glossary 
The probability that a component or system will perform its intended function 
with no failures for a given period of time when used under specified operating 
conditions. 
MaintainabiUty The probability a failed item will be restored or repaired to a specified 
condition within a given period. 
AvaiiabiUty The probability that a repairable system will perform its intended function at a 
given point in time or over a specified period of time when operated and 
maintained in a prescribed manner. Thus, availability is a function of reliability 
and maintainability. 
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